significantly. In contrast to the 'drawn-out, conflict-ridden budget cycle' (Chaisty 2006, p.161) in 1993, the 'procedural breakdown and deadlock' (Ostrow 2000 (Ostrow , p.118) apparent in 1994 (Ostrow and 1995 , and the production in 1997 of 'a budget that could not be implemented and which was not fulfilled until half-way through the year it was intended to cover' (Troxel 2003, p.159) , the parliamentary passage of Russian budgets has become much less eventful. 3 As a result, this article does not attempt to answer a related, but broader, question: What influence does the State Duma, and deputies, have on the overall budget decision-making process? 4 See, for example, this list specifying which Duma committees were responsible for reviewing spending figures in different functional categories of the 2017 budget: http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/(ViewDoc)?OpenAgent&work/dz.nsf/ByID&D917B4455A2C2F94432580 5A006294D7 (last accessed 20 November 2016). 5 Expertise is also provided by the Audit Chamber, which produces a report (zaklyuchenie) on budget bills. 6 See, for example, Sinel'nikov, Batkibekov and Zolotareva (1999) and Iwasaki (2002) . Remington (2008) is an exception, providing a chapter-length commentary on Russian budget politics, although this includes data from a mixed time period. For example, data on the signing date and length of budgets is presented for 1992-2002, although the chapter also includes references to dynamics in the fourth Duma convocation (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . Chaisty (2012, p.97 ) also provides a brief overview of budgeting changes during the 2000s.
For example, whereas Russian budgets during the 1990s were often signed into law after the beginning of the planned fiscal year, this has not occurred since the 1999 budget. And, whereas Duma bill reading votes during the 1990s were often unpredictable -sometimes even resulting in failure -voting coalitions have become predictable, largely stable across readings, and successful. Government's initiative. However, bill velocity might not capture legislature-specific scrutiny. Various actors could be involved in the activities taking place during the legislative stage, and the time spent during this stage might not relate specifically to scrutiny. In response to this ambiguity, the middle graph presents a measure that should more closely track Duma scrutiny. Specifically, this measure is a proxy for the length of time budget bills are discussed in Duma plenary sessions. 8 The trend presented is congruent with the decline in bill velocity over time, although the change in floor activity is more than a twofold reduction, and the decline begins earlier.
The bottom graph in Figure 1 suggests, moreover, a relationship between this reduced Duma activity and the extent of change experienced by budget bills during legislative review. This graph presents a measure of text similarity between introduced bill and final law dyads for the 2002 to 2016 budgets. 9 The extent of budget bill amendment has reduced over time, with 7 By contrast, Ostrow (2000, p.138 ) -writing of budgeting in the 1990s -remarks, '[w]hen budget votes are held in the Duma, no one has any idea what the outcome will be'. 8 The figures reported are the number of HTML lines of source code used to compose online transcripts of budget bill discussions on the Duma floor. Thus, the longer a bill is discussed on the floor, the more lines of text compose the official transcript, and the more HTML lines are needed to construct the webpage. As such, the measure is bounded on the left at 0 and unbounded on the right. 9 Specifically, the figures relate to percentage text change, focusing on unique word frequency differencesfigures calculated according to the system proposed by Pedrazzani and Zucchini (2013) and using the JFreq programme (http://conjugateprior.org/software/jfreq/).
lobbying by United Russia deputies', characterising the formal changes as 'a major blow to the parliament's authority.'
Amendments and spending figures
The longitudinal picture of bill change presented in the lower graph of Figure 1 The following will explore three possibilities, the first of which is that changes reflect legislator influence.
Legislator influence
Amendments made to budget initiatives during parliamentary passage are often attributed to legislator influence. According to Meyer and Naka (1998, p.273, footnote 19) , 'deviations in budgetary outcomes from proposals reflect the political power of the legislative and executive branch. The formulation of the budget can then be modelled as a bargaining process'. This strategic model is common in studies of the legislative stage of budgeting. Araya (2015, p.220) , for example, argues that, '[w] hile the government has no motivations to amend its budget bill, the assembly is interested in adapting the budget to its preferences'.
Similarly, in a study on US state budgeting, Clarke (1998, p.12) One way to evaluate the hypothesis that parliamentarians are responsible for spending figure changes is to look at the direction of change. Are spending redistributions consistent with legislator -and, in turn, citizen -priorities? White (1982, pp.84-87) uses this approach in his study of budget amendments introduced in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Finding 'evidence of a consistent attempt to increase the allocation of resources on categories of expenditure of obvious public appeal, such as socio-cultural purposes and the republics, rather than on others which may be of less immediate interest to local areas and constituents, such as administration, arms and the economy', White tentatively suggests that this might reflect 'an embryonic form of 'linkage politics', connecting the mass public, deputies, the Supreme Soviet and the national budget ' (1982, p.87) . 22 Working from this insight, Figure [ Figure 3 around here]
[ Figure 4 around here]
Overall, the picture presented by Figures 3 and 4 bears a striking resemblance to White's (1982) findings: during legislative passage, spending is -on average -redistributed away from administration, defence, security, and the economy to areas such as housing, education, and social policy. Could it be that Duma deputies have been successful in amending budget bills, tailoring them more to their -and citizens' -preferences?
There are reasons to be cautious in interpreting these amendment data as clear-cut evidence of independent legislator influence. Firstly, the small number of observations available, as well as the variation displayed over these years, mean that we cannot speak of robust trends.
Secondly, we have insufficient information regarding the divergent preferences of the 22 This is congruent with assumptions found in other, more recent works. For example, Miller (2015, p.703) argues that 'increases in education and social welfare spending constitute general policy concessions, whereas increases in military spending indicate greater attention to satisfying elites'. Russian executive and Duma deputies in order to work back from observed category spending figure changes to actor influence. And, thirdly, even if these changes were consistent with clear estimations of actor preferences, this would not tell us why such changes were made to the budget bill. For example, rather than concessions granted to oppositional legislators, figure changes could be cosmetic amendments, granted to cultivate an image of executive magnanimity -or to help regime-loyal deputies to claim credit for spending beneficial to their nominal constituents.
[ Figure 5 around here]
Information on particular moved amendments should, however, help uncover the springs of change. Figure 5 presents a longitudinal picture of the raw number of amendments proposed and accepted for Russian budget bills, 2007-2016. 24 Overall, the trend is consistent with the diachronic data on bill text amendment presented in figure 1: a reduction over time. But who is responsible for these particular amendments? Figure 6 presents data on the formal sponsorship of successful amendments, expressed as the percentage formally sponsored by the Government.
[ Figure 6 around here] 2006: 130; and Noble 2016a, 2016b) . What, then, explains Government-sponsored changes to Government-drafted budget bills? We will now turn to two further explanations for bill amendments.
Technical updating
The budget bill might require technical updating, given revised economic data following bill introduction into the legislature. There is evidence of this beyond Russia. In Chile, for example, Baldez and Carey (2001: 122-123) note that 'the executive proposal is originally submitted on October 1. During the next sixty days, as fourth-quarter tax receipts and economic projections take shape, the executive itself inevitably wants to make changes to fine tune its budget projections'. Similarly, Wehner (2013: 555) writes that executive amendments are sometimes the result of 'updated economic forecasts' in Sweden. 29 One broader implication of these findings, of course, is that formal sponsorship information cannot provide a reliable guide to the actual agents of change or the ideational sources of amendments. 30 That being said, we have very little information concerning the actors included in these discussions, as well as the extent to which the negotiations are efficient in reconciling executive and legislative preferences on spending commitments. For budgeting in the third Duma convocation, Iwasaki (2002: 309-310) reports that issues remained unresolved following 'zero readings', meaning that the Federal Assembly's discussion occupie[][d] a very important position in the budget compilation'. However, this relates to a period of markedly different executive-legislative relations. It is plausible to assume that, when pre-parliamentary executivelegislative discussions now take place, issues raised are resolved more effectively. 31 Specifically, for these ten budget bills, co-sponsored amendments numbered 9, 2, 0, 21, 1, 2, 4, 0, 0, and 0, respectively. These numbers are drawn from the committee amendment tables on the bills' webpages. Although such changes might be truly technical -not being the object of contestation between actors, that is -another plausible executive-centred account of budget bill amendments highlights the likelihood of intra-executive dispute. In brief, this explanation contends that budget changes reflect the resolution of intra-executive conflict over spending commitments, which spill over from pre-parliamentary, cabinet-level discussions.
Intra-executive spending disputes
Federal budget bills signed off by the Russian Government are not finalised documents. In theory, cabinet sign-off should signify that executive actors have reached their final positions on the details of budget bills. This comes at the end of a long and arduous decision-making process: draft macro-economic prognoses, and draft tax and spending policy documents, are circulated for discussion in spring, before discussion of budget parameters over the summer, and the draft budget is discussed by Government in the autumn. 33 However, there is evidence that intra-executive decision-making on the budget continues after cabinet sign-off. The following will present and discuss three types of evidence demonstrating that executive 32 actors anticipate the continuation of decision-making at the point of bill sign-off; that decision-making does, in fact, continue; and that this has measurable effects on budget drafts following cabinet sign-off.
34
In the formal decisions published following budget bill sign-off meetings, Government actors have been instructed to develop the respective bills. These instructions have been given for every budget bill for which data is available, excluding the 2010 budget. 35 This quite clearly puts paid to the notion that bill sign-off marks the end of intra-executive discussion. Take 38 34 This evidence involves partial transcripts of Government meetings, made available on the Government's official website. There are, clearly, reasons to be cautious when using this information. As an incomplete and public record, it is unclear which portions of discussion are not made available; and actors are, no doubt, fully aware of the strategic considerations necessary when discussing policy matters in public. As a result, this information cannot be taken as a faithful record of intra-executive relations. 35 These formal decisions are available on the Government's website: http://government.ru/meetings/. 36 The formal decision is available here: http://government.ru/meetings/5830/decisions/ (last accessed 20 November 2016). 37 See also Prokopenko and Bazanova (13 October 2015, Vedomosti) . 38 Budget drafts signed off on by Government are hosted on the website http://regulation.gov.ru/.
It is unlikely, moreover, that these spending figure changes made after Government sign-off, . 41 Indeed, these difficulties associated with intra-executive decision-making are, no doubt, compounded during periods of economic crisis, during which socio-economic conditions are volatile, economic prognoses are uncertain, and there are manifest pressures on resource distribution. 42 In addition, the possibility of presidential intervention in decision-making -as noted above -likely weakens the incentives for inter-ministerial cooperation, as well as the likelihood of core executive control (see Fortescue 2012) .
executive actors to challenge and attempt to modify the budget proposal. 43 Moreover, the presence of a disciplined majority of pro-executive Duma deputies removes, in a sense, the hard constraint of Government bill sign-off. Safe in the knowledge that a majority of deputies will ratify changes to Government-sponsored initiatives, intra-executive discussions can spill over into the nominally legislative stage of policy-making (see Noble 2016a Noble , 2016b . 44 As a result, although the legislative stage of the budget process is meant, in theory, to provide an opportunity for parliamentarians to review, critique, and possibly amend budget proposals, this stage can also involve the resolution of intra-executive spending disputes.
Conclusion
Contrary to 'rubber stamp' expectations that the content of bills does not change during legislative review in contemporary Russia, this article demonstrates that budget bills do, in fact, undergo amendment during passage through the State Duma. Various measures of amendment were used above to demonstrate these changes, providing an unprecedented diachronic picture of budgeting in the Federal Assembly. The article also provides a preliminary assessment of the springs of this change, presenting evidence consistent with three hypotheses: legislator influence; technical updating; and intra-executive conflict. There are, it seems, various reasons for budget bill amendment -change is equifinal.
45
One of the novel contributions of the article is its exploration of the hitherto largely unexplored executive springs of change. Intra-executive spending decision-making is not neatly contained in the pre-parliamentary stages of policy-making; the legislative passage of budget initiatives provides a final opportunity for executive actors to battle over the distribution of expenditures. This executive-centred account of budget bill amendments is not restricted to contemporary Russia. Writing of non-democratic Venezuela, Curristine and Bas (2007: 8) write that 'the majority of the amendments are actually proposed by the executive, 43 On the sign-off (soglasovanie) process more generally, see Fortescue (2010) . 44 It might be argued that reputational concerns regarding the airing of the executive's dirty laundry in the relative publicity of parliament would prevent the spill-over of intra-executive conflict into the Duma. And yet, although intra-executive conflict resolution might occur during the stage of parliamentary review, it will unlikely take place in the relative publicity of parliament itself. 45 For discussions of equifinality, see George and Bennett (2005: 161, 215) and Haggard and Kaufman (2012: 498) .
reflecting its need to revise its original budget submission.' And, writing of the USSR, Hough and Fainsod (1979: 378) . 55 For example, in 2004, the sum of absolute values for category spending changes comes to 9,368,283,800 roubles; there was no net overall expenditure change between the budget draft and law, so 0 is subtracted; the initial figure is divided by two; 0 is added; and the final figure, 4,684,141,900, is expressed as a percentage of draft overall expenditure, 2,659,447,000,000, which comes to 0.176 percent. 
